Rand Corporation's Study on Terrorism

2009-12-21T23:00:00.001-08:00

"The comprehensive study analyzes 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, drawing from a terrorism database maintained by RAND and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism"

Fighting Terrorism Pakistan

2009-12-21T22:54:00.000-08:00

Improving Governance in Pakistan is the KEY solution to eliminating extremism, militancy and terrorism

Read details here
http://fightingterrorismpakistan.blogspot.com/

Pakistan Army against Taliban: What are the Waziristan goals?

2009-10-31T00:24:00.000-07:00

By Ben Arnoldy and Staff writer

New Delhi

Pakistan's "South Waziristan offensive" has long had the billing of something epic – a beaches-of-Normandy assault on the mountain caves that form the closest thing to an enemy capital in the war on terror.

In the week and a half since launching its three-pronged attack on the Taliban stronghold, the Pakistan Army claims it has killed more than 160 militants and lost two dozen soldiers. Today, the Army claimed it had killed 42 in its march toward Taliban strongholds. Over the weekend, it recaptured the key town of Kotkai, which has switched hands three times since the offensive began – a sign of the fierce resistance the Taliban is putting up.

Given the Pakistani military's lack of capacity and a diminished enemy, however, analysts suspect Pakistan won't try to reclaim all of South Waziristan. Instead, they say, its aims are more modest and surgical: to eradicate a group of Al Qaeda-linked Uzbek militants and some local supporters.

Those goals need not involve the massive infusion of forces that a counterinsurgency effort would require, nor hold out the prospect of closing down South Waziristan as a militant haven on the border of Afghanistan. Even achieving limited aims, however, could prove difficult – depending on Pakistan's ability to keep other militant factions at bay.

Target the Uzbeks

During talks with security experts before the offensive began, Army Chief Gen. Ashfaq Kiyani "was of the opinion that the dynamics of South Waziristan might change if we can take out the Uzbek fighters," says Imtiaz Gul, a security analyst in Islamabad. "They are the staunchest followers of Al Qaeda ideology, and they are viciously, rabidly anti-Army."

Some 1,000 to 2,000 Uzbek fighters are thought to remain in South Waziristan as part of the Al Qaeda group, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). They fled there from Afghanistan after fighting the US at Operation Anaconda in 2002.

In recent months, both the longtime leader of the IMU and their main hosts in South Waziristan, the Mehsud faction of the Taliban, have lost leaders to drone strikes, Tahir Yuldashev of the Uzbeks and Pakistani Taliban chief Baitullah Mehsud. Their deaths have given the military an opening to squeeze both groups.

Hawks in Pakistan and the US have urged Pakistan to used counterinsurgency to clear tribal areas like South Waziristan of militants, hold them with government forces, and bring development to ensure their future loyalty.

But such visions remain a chimera given the limited number of troops Pakistan has available, argues Sameer Lalwani, author of a new report for the New America Foundation that examines the Army's capabilities to carry out counterinsurgency.

Not enough troops for the job?

His research finds that between 370,000 and 430,000 more troops would be needed to carry out a counterinsurgency across the militant-heavy tribal zone and frontier province. The most Pakistan could free up from its border with India would be 152,000 more. Cobbling together a force of the needed size would take two to five years.

That arithmetic equals a big negative for Western commanders in Afghanistan. "The US and NATO would like some greater control of the [Afghan-Pakistani] border," says Mr. Lalwani. "At some point, the more control you want to have over the border, the more you need a campaign that looks increasingly like counterinsurgency."

Some 28,000 troops are facing off against a force of Uzbeks and Taliban numbering at least 12,000 fighters. "That is going to be a really bloody fight," says Lalwani. "They've had higher force ratios before and it's been pretty bloody for them."

There are further possibilities of unintended escalation. "The danger exists that this becomes a tribal issue," says Shuja Nawaz, a Pakistan analyst with The Atlantic Council, a Washington-based think tank. "If all the Mehsuds see this as an attack against them, this will become a long and drawn-out struggle."

http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/1027/p06s01-wosc.html

'War on Terror' by Mumtaz A. Piracha

2008-10-02T00:51:00.000-07:00

The 'War on Terror' has become the most-talked about, written-about and propagated and publicized topic around the world and particularly in Pakistan. There are more than 16 million entries under the search term 'War on Terror' on the world's #1 search engine, Google. There are over 3 million entries under the search term 'Pakistan War on Terror.'

A wide collection of articles, books and documents are listed. It is simply impossible to scan the entire collection or a sizeable part of it. A few glances over the literature, however, do give you an overall picture of global terrorism. Richard Miniter's book "Shadow War," Jordan J. Paust's book " Beyond the Law," Bill Sammon's book "Fighting Back," and the websites www.socialistworker.org, http://www.lib.umich.edu/govdocs/usterror.html, http://www.amnestyusa.org/war-on-terror/page.do?id=1021007&n1=3&n2=821, and a host of articles published in the newspapers and journals provide a 'peep' and food for thought.

Since the 'War on Terror' is still in progress and classified information is yet to be de-classified, the historians are unable to pen down authentic, unbiased, and well-documented episodes of the whole war or parts thereof. It is almost impossible to draw ENTIRELY objective, authentic and reliable conclusions from the compilation of documents available on the Internet. There are far more assumptions, conflicting statements and divergent views. As far as I could decipher the documents and understand the phenomenon of 'War on Terror,' I share my conclusions with you within the sphere of limitations cited above.

1. The War on Terror is based on the terrorist attacks that took place against the US establishments in the various parts of the world prior to 9/11 and the 9/11 attack on World Trade Center in New York. All those incidents are clubbed to form an overall picture of the mastermind who is assumed to be Osama bin Laden, leading his 'Al Qaeda' from the rugged mountains of Afghanistan and Pak-Afghan border.

2. The leads from the terrorist attacks in various arts of the globe has taken the US to Afghanistan and Pakistan in pursuit of the perpetrators, assumed to be part of the 'Al Qaeda' network.

3. It is assumed that Osama bin Laden is heaquartered in Afghanistan or Pak-Afghan border alongwith his 'Al Qaeda' leadership, masterminding terrorist attacks on the US and Nato forces stationed in Afghanistan. The focus has shifted and confined to terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and the presumed presence of 'Al Qaeda' leadership in this region.

4. Afghanistan is being ruled by AfghanTaliban, Afghan war lords and Kabul government of President Hamid Karzai in their controlled parts of Afghanistan. There is no single government in place.

5. Afghan Taliban's activities are confined to Afghanistan. It is simply impossible for them to cross the Pak-Afghan border and engage themselves in the tribal belt or elsewhere in Pakistan.

6. The militants assumed to be operating in the tribal belt are altogether a different lot. These are, in all probability, the local armed men who are defending themselves and their foreign 'guests' who fought in the 'Afghan Jihad' against the Soviet Union and later migrated from Afghanistan to the tribal belt after the US attack on Aghanistan in 2001.' These armed men do not have the motive, desire and capacity to enter and attack in other parts of Pakistan or Afghanistan.

7. The terrorist attacks within Pakistan do not appear to have a link to the Afghan Taliban or Fata militants. These attacks, in all probability, are being planned and executed by a multitude of organizations banned under the label of terrorist organizations. They are fighting a 'Jihad' against the US and the 'friends' of America who are supporting the US in its War on Terror. For them, it is obviously a 'Jihad' against the Jewish-Christian forces who are assumed to have their own 'nefarious' designs to eliminate Muslims and Islam.

8. A fourth force at work, in all probability, comprises the hired mercenaries who are carrying out terorist attacks within Pakistan at the behest of our great neighbour who assumes and propagates that every terrorist attack in its country or Kashmir is planned and executed by Pakistan's intelligence agencies through 'Jihadi' outfits.

9. A fifth force at work, in all probability, comprises the localized armed fighters who are trained to fight against the government in Pakistan for their rights at the behest of their localized leaders.

The whole situation is a cobweb of linkages from various sources. There is a Afghan Taliban-led war of independence against the US and Nato in Afghanistan, there is a resistance movement in Fata, there is a conglomerate of 'Jihadi' outfits operating against the US and its Pakistani friends, there are India's sponsored terrorist groups and there are localized armed human rights activists in sensitive parts of Pakistan.

I am of the view that we need a comprehensive multi-faceted strategic plan to deal with terrorism. There is NO all-embracing single solution. The strategic plan will certainly need investment of billions of dollars and rupees in our civilian intelligence network, law enforcement agencies, infra-structural development in the affected regions, consistent and sustainable reforms in education to undo the brainwashing of people in sensitive parts of the country and systematic support linkage between the civilian and military intelligence agencies.

RAND Corp Study

U.S. Should Rethink "War On Terrorism" Strategy to Deal with Resurgent Al QaidaCurrent U.S. strategy against the terrorist group al Qaida has not been successful in significantly undermining the group's capabilities, according to a new RAND Corporation study issued today. Al Qaida has been involved in more terrorist attacks since Sept. 11, 2001, than it was during its prior history and the group's attacks since then have spanned an increasingly broader range of targets in Europe, Asia, the Middle East and Africa, according to researchers. In looking at how other terrorist groups have ended, the RAND study found that most terrorist groups end either because they join the political process, or because local police and intelligence efforts arrest or kill key members. Police and intelligence agencies, rather than the military, should be the tip of the spear against al Qaida in most of the world, and the United States should abandon the use of the phrase "war on terrorism," researchers concluded. "The United States cannot conduct an effective long-term counterterrorism campaign against al Qaida or other terrorist groups without understanding how terrorist groups end," said Seth Jones, the study's lead author and a political scientist at RAND, a nonprofit research organization. "In most cases, military force isn't the best instrument." The comprehensive study analyzes 648 terrorist groups that existed between 1968 and 2006, drawing from a terrorism database maintained by RAND and the Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism. The most common way that terrorist groups end -- 43 percent -- was via a transition to the political process. However, the possibility of a political solution is more likely if the group has narrow goals, rather than a broad, sweeping agenda like al Qaida possesses. The second most common way that terrorist groups end -- 40 percent -- was through police and intelligence services either apprehending or killing the key leaders of these groups. Policing is especially effective in dealing with terrorists because police have a permanent presence in cities that enables them to efficiently gather information, Jones said. Military force was effective in only 7 percent of the cases examined; in most instances, military force is too blunt an instrument to be successful against terrorist groups, although it can be useful for quelling insurgencies in which the terrorist groups are large, well-armed and well-organized, according to researchers. In a number of cases, the groups end because they become splintered, with members joining other groups or forming new factions. Terrorist groups achieved victory in only 10 percent of the cases studied. Jones says the study has crucial implications for U.S. strategy in dealing with al Qaida and other terrorist groups. Since al Qaida's goal is the establishment of a pan-Islamic caliphate, a political solution or negotiated settlement with governments in the Middle East is highly unlikely. The terrorist organization also has made numerous enemies and does not enjoy the kind of mass support received by other organizations such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, largely because al Qaida has not engaged in sponsoring any welfare services, medical clinics, or hospitals. The study recommends the United States should adopt a two-front strategy: rely on policing and intelligence work to root out the terrorist leaders in Europe, North America, Asia and the Middle East, and involve military force -- though not necessarily the U.S. military -- when insurgencies are involved. The United States also should avoid the use of the term, "war on terror," and replace it with the term "counterterrorism." Nearly every U.S. ally, including the United Kingdom and Australia, has stopped using "war on terror," and Jones said it's more than a mere matter of semantics. "The term we use to describe our strategy toward terrorists is important, because it affects what kinds of forces you use," Jones said. "Terrorists should be perceived and described as criminals, not holy warriors, and our analysis suggests that there is no battlefield solution to terrorism." Among the other findings, the study notes: Religious terrorist groups take longer to eliminate than other groups. Since 1968, approximately 62 percent of all terrorist groups have ended, while only 32 percent of religious terrorist groups have done so. No religious terrorist group has achieved victory since 1968. Size is an important predictor of a groups' fate. Large groups of more than 10,000 members have been victorious more than 25 percent of the time, while victory is rare when groups are smaller than 1,000 members. There is no statistical correlation between the duration of a terrorist group and ideological motivation, economic conditions, regime type or the breadth of terrorist goals. Terrorist groups that become involved in an insurgency do not end easily. Nearly 50 percent of the time they end with a negotiated settlement with the government, 25 percent of the time they achieved victory and 19 percent of the time, military groups defeated them. Terrorist groups from upper-income countries are much more likely to be left-wing or nationalistic, and much less likely to be motivated by religion. "The United States has the necessary instruments to defeat al Qaida, it just needs to shift its strategy and keep in mind that terrorist groups are not eradicated overnight," Jones said. The study, "How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for Countering al Qaida," can be found at www.rand.org. The report was prepared by the RAND National Defense Research Institute, a federally funded research and development center that does research for the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, the unified commands and other defense agencies. Learn MoreFull DocumentResearch BriefNational Security Research AreaE-mail sign up
About the RAND CorporationThe RAND Corporation is a nonprofit research organization providing objective analysis and effective solutions that address the challenges facing the public and private sectors around the world.

Taliban and Terrorism

Rand Corporation's Study on Terrorism

Fighting Terrorism Pakistan

Pakistan Army against Taliban: What are the Waziristan goals?

By Ben Arnoldy and Staff writer

'War on Terror' by Mumtaz A. Piracha